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NOTE
TAKINGS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
NEW YORK: A CONSTITUTIONAL
SLAM DUNK?
Alexander D. Racketa*
Professional sports stadiums and arenas funded or subsidized by
taxpayers are not a new development. In recent years, however, the use
of eminent domain to facilitate the aggregation of landfor these major
projects is a tactic that has gained in popularity. While this is clearly
permissible under recent Supreme Court interpretations of the United
States Constitution, it is less clear that this is permissible under the New
York constitution. The New York Court of Appeals has never directly
confronted this constitutional question. Instead, the Court of Appeals
usually upholds seizures on less controversial grounds, such as public
use in the classic sense or curing harmful conditions like urban blight.
The court used these less controversialgrounds to uphold a seizure of
private land to facilitate construction of a new basketball arena in
Brooklyn for the New Jersey Nets. The Court of Appeals' silence on the
use of eminent domain to facilitate the aggregation of land for major
projects has led to decisions in lower courts that allow such takings
based solely on economic development grounds and lower courts possibly using subterfuge or pretext in classifying certain areas as blighted.
The Court of Appeals should expressly state that economic development
is not a permissiblepublic use, as constrainedby the New York constitution, and more diligently police the boundaries of the definition of blight
to prevent pretext and ensure that the public purpose of a project is truly
the dominant purpose.
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INTRODUCTION

Eminent domain and possible legislative protections against takings
have recently become a divisive issue nationwide, and New York is no
exception.' The ability to take private property for public purpose under
eminent domain is recognized as a sovereign power, not dependent on
any express grant of power by a constitutional provision. 2 This power,

however, is limited. The United States Constitution, 3 the Constitution of
the State of New York, 4 and, more recently, New York Eminent Domain
Procedure Law5 govern the state's eminent domain power.
1 See generally Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London:
Eminent Domain, Federalism,and CongressionalPowers, 32 J. LEGIs. 165 (2006) (discussing
congressional restraints on state and local control over government takings in the wake of the
Court's decision); John Caher, "Kelo"-relatedBills Pass Senate JudiciaryBody, 235 N.Y.L.J.
2 (2006) (discussing progress of New York legislation); Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and
Eminent Domain's "Summer of Scrutiny," 59 ALA. L. REv. 561 (2008) (reviewing the court's
decision and legislative responses); James Freda, Note, Does New London Burn Again?: Eminent Domain, Liberty and Populism in the Wake of Kelo, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 483
(2006) (discussing popular outcry and legislative reaction to Kelo).
2 Heyward v. Mayor of New York, 7 N.Y. 314, 324 (1852).
3 U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation."); see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005).
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (amended 2001).
5 N.Y. EM. Dom. PRoc. LAW §§ 101-709 (2002).
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At the heart of the debate is Kelo v. City of New London,6 a controversial decision that explored the outer bounds of "public use" as it is
used in the Fifth Amendment. While the court narrowly affirmed a taking under Connecticut law, which did not require a finding of blight,7
many considered the case an uncontroversial outgrowth of twentieth century eminent domain jurisprudence. 8 Inarguably, however, the Kelo
opinions helped define three competing interpretations of "public use."9
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, accepted economic development as a permissible public use.' Justice O'Connor's dissent rejected pure economic development as public use and instead would
require that any transfer of public land to private parties first show that it
remedies a public harm such as blight or oligopoly.'" The third opinion,
a dissent by Justice Thomas, argued that neither a finding of blight nor an
intention to ameliorate blight constitutes a valid public purpose.12 Notably, the majority in Kelo pointed out that if states were unhappy with this
permissive interpretation of public use, they could restrict it by statute or
state constitution.13
This Note explores whether New York allows the same expansive
definition of public use adopted by the court in Kelo or whether the New
York constitution further limits the eminent domain power. Part I discusses the history of New York eminent domain law. This historical
tracing begins in the early days of the Takings Clause in the New York
constitution and follows its treatment in subsequent constitutional conventions and legislation. Part H examines the current state of eminent
domain law, the modem interpretation of "public use," and the New
York Court of Appeals' reluctance to definitively speak on the matter.
The capture of a large array of public uses under the current definition of
blight and the effect this has had on the development of the law of public
use in New York is also discussed. Part III studies in depth the case of
Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.14 This recent
decision by the New York Court of Appeals illustrates many of the key
6 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
7 Id. at 483-84.
8 See e.g., Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. C. L. REv. 663,
682-83 (2006).
9 See, e.g., Trent L. Pepper, Note, Blight Elimination Takings as Eminent Domain
Abuse: The Great Lakes States in Kelo's Public Use Paradigms,5 AvE MARIA L. REV. 299,
304-08 (2007).
10 Kelo 545 U.S. at 484.
11 See id. at 500-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12 See id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he government may take property only if it
actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.").
13 See id. at 489 (majority opinion).
14 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).

194

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20:191

issues in New York takings law. While this case had the potential to
fundamentally alter New York takings law, it does not substantially deviate from other eminent domain cases. Part IV discusses potential judicial
solutions to the main issues surrounding takings law. This Part highlights the missed opportunities to rein in the expansive scope of eminent
domain power, and the potential consequences of not acting.

I. THE

SCOPE OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER UNDER THE NEW
YORK CONSTITUTION

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." 15 This clause, incorporated against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, functions as a limit on states' takings power. Under the U.S. system of federal and state jurisdictions,
incorporated constitutional rights define a minimum level of legal protection, while the states are free to add further protections through their own
constitutions. 16 Thus, while the Takings Clause principles elaborated in
Kelo do not restrict states such as New York from adding heightened
protections for property owners, they preserve a mandatory floor of
protection.
Eminent domain as a limited sovereign power has taken several
forms through different periods of New York's history. Unsurprisingly,
the New York courts and legislatures have expanded the power over
time, seeking to allow the government greater flexibility to take private
property for a public purpose. When the evolution of permissible public
uses under the eminent domain power is neatly separated into three separate regimes (not necessarily divided chronologically) they fit nicely into
the framework of the three opinions in Kelo.17
A.

Eminent Domain Takings in the Nineteenth Century

The eminent domain power was weakest during the early years of
statehood. During this period, the state government had power to take
private property only for "classic" public uses: situations when the state
or municipality owns the property or when a private party holds the prop-

erty in common for the public. Under this understanding of public use,
the courts would overrule the taking unless its purpose was truly public.
15 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
16 See Judith S. Kaye, Assoc. Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Dual Constitutionalism in

Practice and Principle (Feb. 26, 1987) (transcript available at http://www.nycourts.gov/history/
elecbook/kayecardozo/pgl.htm) (describing the historical and theoretical underpinnings of
federalism and the preservation of rights).
17 See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; see also Pepper, supra note 9.
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For example, in In re Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Railway Co., the court
declined to uphold a proposed taking that would create a private railroad
to service sightseeing trips to Niagara Falls. 18 Distinguishing this project
from more traditional rail lines and noting that the railroad would serve
only interested sightseers for a short time during the year, the court reasoned that the taking's purpose was not truly public.' 9
Justice Thomas' dissent in Kelo also illustrates this traditional and
narrow understanding of eminent domain power.20 Justice Thomas
found the line of cases leading to Kelo to be at odds with the basic constitutional principles upon which they purportedly relied, and instead
supported the idea that "the government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property." 2 1 Under
this construction of "public use," only a classic public use is recognized
as valid.
B.

Muller and the 1938 and 1967 Constitutions

The New York Court of Appeals began recognizing a greatly expanded concept of public use in the early twentieth century. The court
reached a significant turning point in New York City Housing Authority v.
Muller where it deviated from its restrictive readings of the Takings
Clause and approved a novel public use. 2 2 In Muller, the New York City
Housing Authority made plans to erect a low-income housing development, and, to accomplish this, it needed to condemn privately owned
tenement houses pursuant to its statutorily granted power of eminent domain.2 3 Acknowledging the lack of precedent, the court upheld this project as a valid exercise of eminent domain power. 24 By replacing
"unsanitary and substandard housing conditions," the housing project
would serve a valid public use because the new buildings would eliminate the public menace of a slum and provide low-cost housing. 25
Two years after the Muller decision, the 1938 Constitutional Convention added a provision that expressly created a new ground for exercise of the eminent domain power.26 In addition to preserving the classic
public uses, the new provision explicitly empowered the state to con18 See In re Niagara Falls, 15 N.E. 429, 432-33 (N.Y. 1888).
Id. at 432.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 515-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
See id. at 153-54.
Id. at 155-56.
See id. at 154-55.
26 See N.Y. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 1 (amended 2001).
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
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demn land for the purpose of clearing slums or constructing low-cost

housing. 27
In 1967, New York voters called another constitutional convention.
A provision proposed by this convention explicitly authorized eminent
domain takings for economic development unconnected with slum clearance or creation of low-cost housing. 28 The constitution proposed in
1967 failed to gain enough votes for ratification, and so the proposed
constitutionally explicit recognition of economic development as a public
use was defeated.
Justice O'Connor's Kelo opinion roughly approximates this concept. In her dissent, O'Connor argued that a taking for purely economic
development is not a valid public use. 2 9 Instead, under her framework, a
taking that would result in a transfer to another private party must eliminate some harmful use to be valid.3 0 The 1938 constitution's concept of
slum clearance can be fairly described as elimination of a harmful use,
while the provision relating to creation of public housing can be considered simply a modification of the previous understanding of classic public uses.3 1
C.

Economic Development
The twentieth century saw significant expansion in the interpreta-

tion of the New York Takings Clause. While the New York Court of
Appeals has never held that economic development constitutes a public
use, lower state courts have accepted the doctrine. 32
The majority opinion in Kelo held that economic development is a
public use under the U.S. Constitution.3 3 There is no requirement that
the property be blighted or that the public have access to, or otherwise
benefit from, the condemned property. 34 Though the opinion generated
significant publicity and controversy when it was first issued,35 it essentially only shifted the minimum required showing for a condemnation.
27 See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: HOUSING
LABOR AND NATURAL RESOURCES 20 (1967) [hereinafter STATE COMMISSION] (explaining that

"[s]ection 1 [of Article XVEI] was intended merely to obviate any doubt as to the power of the
Legislature to provide for 'low rent housing for persons of low income' and 'the clearance,
replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary areas"'); infra Part
II.A.
28 See STATE COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 22-24.

29 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 498 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30 See id. 500-01 (citing previous Court decisions upholding takings to correct territorial
ills of blight and oligopoly).
31 See N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § I (amended 2001).
32 See infra Part II for in-depth discussion of this development.
3 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84.
34 See id.
35 See Burke, supra note 8, at 684. U.S. Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) went so
far as to compare the Court's holding to "undermining motherhood and apple pie." Id.
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In New York, the current and future ramifications of the opinion are still

unclear.

II. NEW YORK'S IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AS A VALID PUBLIC USE
The New York Court of Appeals has not yet held that New York
State's Takings Clause is coterminous with the U.S. Constitution's Tak-

ings Clause. Despite this lack of explicit endorsement for economic development as a public use, the Court of Appeals has upheld takings that

draw close to, and sometimes blur, the line between economic development and blight reduction or slum clearance.
A. No Explicit Recognition of Bare Economic Development as Public
Use
New York's highest court has never endorsed economic development as a valid public use without other factors, despite ample opportunity to do so. Instead, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly couched its
discussions of public use in terms of blight or "substandard and insanitary" conditions and clearance of slums for low-cost housing, as provided for in the 1938 constitution3 6 and pre-1938 common law, 3 7
respectively.
The early recognition of an expansive interpretation of public use
came in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller.38 In that case, a
property owner resisted seizure of two tenement houses, alleging that the
condemnation violated the takings clauses of both the federal and state
constitutions. 39 The court confronted, for the first time, the issue of slum
clearance coupled with creation of low-income housing as a public use. 40
Finding no controlling precedent, the court held that eliminating the evil
of slums, when necessarily combined with the production of low-cost
housing, constituted a valid public use based on rulings in fellow states

and because of the health and safety risks posed by the slums. 4 1
The Muller court insisted that the valid public use in that case included both slum clearance and low-cost housing, going so far as to say
"the two things necessarily go together." 42 The handcuffing of slum
clearance and creation of low-cost housing did not last long. The 1938
New York Constitutional Convention added Article XVIII, § 1, which
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (amended 2001).
37 See New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 154-55 (N.Y. 1936).
36

38 Id.
39 Id. at 153.
40
41

See id. at 154.
Id. at 154-56.

42 Id. at 155.
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curiously allowed for either slum clearance or erection of housing for
low-income persons to constitute public use. 4 3 Accordingly, the question
remained as to whether housing and blight must operate in tandem to
allow a taking.
The New York Court of Appeals resolved the ambiguity of Article
XVIII, § 1 in Murray v. La Guardia.44 The court ruled, based on the
plain meaning of the text and the legislative history, that either slum
clearance or low-cost housing could be a valid public use. One would
suffice without the other. 45 Because the need for slum clearance in Murray was so clear, the court reasoned that substandard and insanitary conditions could be the sole justification of a governmental taking for
rehabilitation of an area. 46
In Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris,47 the New
York Court of Appeals issued a strong statement to municipalities and
agencies that land taken for blight must indeed be substandard. 4 8 While
the court seemed to interpret the state constitutional limits of takings
strictly, language in the opinion nonetheless supported a greatly expanded power of eminent domain for municipalities and community redevelopment corporations. 49
At issue in Yonkers was the condemnation of land by a municipal
redevelopment corporation that the municipality created in order to implement its permissible goals of slum clearance or creation of low-cost
housing.5 0 The court makes clear that an agency needs more than just an
assertion in its pleadings that blight exists:
Here, other than the agency's bare pleading of its "substandard" finding, it provided no further data as to the
condition of the area, except for the general statement
that at least 50% of the structures in the area are "substandard," a figure which, as defendants point out, did no
more than coincide with the figure found in an earlier
comprehensive city plan, which had designated the area
43 See N.Y. CONST. art XVE1I, § 1 (amended 2001). Courts consistently interpret this
clause as creating two separate legislatively approved public uses, despite continued insistence
by petitioners that both uses were required based on a separate statement in the legislative
history. See, e.g., Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164,

167 (N.Y. 2009); Murray v. La Guardia, 52 N.E.2d 884, 889 (N.Y. 1943).
4 52 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1943).
45 See id. at 889.
46 See id.

47 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975).
48 Id. at 332-34 (noting that "courts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the
determination of the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condemnation
cases").

49

See id. at 333-34.

50 Id. at 330; see N.Y. CONsT. art XVIII,

§1

(amended 2001).
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here involved as suitable for rehabilitation rather than
clearance. No more can be found in the rest of the
agency's supporting papers. They supply only information about the improvements which will be made by Otis
after it receives the land and the conditions placed upon
Otis' subsequent use of the land. The agency has not
indicated in any manner the grounds upon which it concluded that the land is presently substandard. 5 '
Despite the agency's failure to adequately prove that the land was
substandard, the court did not grant relief to the property owners because
they failed to properly raise the issue of the quality of the land in their
pleadings. 52 Notwithstanding the holding, the language of the court
makes clear that without a finding that the condemned land was substandard, a taking is impermissible under the constitution unless the respondents can advance some other public use.53
The Yonkers decision marked an expansion of what the term "substandard and insanitary" encompasses. 54 Although the government must
make an actual showing of substandard conditions, "the agency's road is
made easier by the liberal rather than literal definition of 'blighted' area
now universally indorsed by case law."5 5 Thus, the Yonkers decision
provided a firm commitment to the substandard conditions requirement
while also significantly expanding what constitutes substandard
conditions.
The holdings in Cannata v. City of New York5 6 and Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority57 represent the ostensible
high-water mark for economic development as a public purpose for eminent domain takings. Both cases authorize takings on grounds that approach bare economic development.
In Cannata, sixty-eight homeowners challenged the proposed condemnation of their properties under New York General Municipal Law
which authorized takings when an area was predominantly vacant and
contained other indicia of blight.5 8 Although the statute appeared to
eliminate a requirement of physical blight for the purposes of slum clear51 See Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 332-33.
52 See id. at 334.
53 See id. at 331.
54 See N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
55 Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 332.
56 182 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 1962).
57 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963).
58 See Cannata, 182 N.E.2d at 396; see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw
pealed 1961).

§ 72-n

(1960) (re-
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ance as a public use, it still required some form of intangible blight.59
Over plaintiffs' argument that the land could not be taken because it
lacked "tangible physical blight," the New York Court of Appeals held
that redevelopment for public use could apply to areas that were not yet
slums. 6 0 Accordingly, ameliorating conditions that "arrest the sound
growth of the community .

.

. or tend to create slums or blighted areas"

will constitute a valid public use.6 1 The area in dispute in Cannata was
at least 75% vacant, with poor street design and implicated several other
statutory factors. 62 While Cannata may appear to authorize takings for
any sort of economic development, it is important to note that the New
York Court of Appeals still required a finding that the land was substandard pursuant to Article XVIII of the 1938 New York constitution. 63
The New York Court of Appeals was faced with another expansive
assertion of public use in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New
York Authority."4 The justification for the taking in Courtesy Sandwich
Shop did not hinge on blight, slum clearance, or insanitary conditions;
rather, the public purpose that permitted the taking rested on "facilitating
the flow of commerce and centralizing all activity incident thereto." 65
The proposed public project at issue in Courtesy Sandwich Shop
was the World Trade Center, a facility to be built for "the centralized
accommodation of functions, activities, and services for or incidental to
the transportation of persons, the exchange, buying, selling, and transportation of commodities and property." 66 The court reasoned by analogy
that development of a World Trade Center was not very different from
development of harbor facilities or promotion of public markets for the
exchange of goods. 67 The court pointed out that both of these public
purposes had been upheld without significant controversy as public uses
in the traditional sense. 68 With these rulings in mind, as well as the very
expansive interpretations of "public use" in recent decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, 69 the Courtesy Sandwich Shop court did
not consider the World Trade Center project a very controversial public
59 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW

§ 72-n

(1951) (current version at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW

§ 500, art. 15).
60
61
62
63

See
See
See
See

Cannata, 182 N.E.2d at 397.
id. at 396-97.
id.
id. at 398 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); N.Y. CONST. art. XVIHI,

§ 1 (amended

2001).
64 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963).
65 See id. at 405.
66 Id.

67 See id. at 404-05.

68 See id. (citing In re Mayor of New York, 31 N.E. 1043 (N.Y. 1892); In re Cooper, 28
Hun 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882), appeal dismissed in 93 N.Y. 507 (1883)).
69 See id. (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
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use to uphold. 70 The New York Court of Appeals was careful to couch
the public use in terms of traditional public uses like markets and never
approached recognizing the validity of bare economic development as a
public use.7 '
As the above-discussed cases illustrate, the New York Court of Appeals has never recognized economic development as a valid public use
without some connection to slum clearance, tangible or intangible blight
amelioration, or a public use in the classic sense. Nor has the court disavowed bare economic development, i.e. private improvement, and use
alone as a valid justification.
B.

Unwillingness to Strictly Police the Agencies and Municipalities

The New York Court of Appeals has refused to closely examine
factual findings made by agencies and municipalities as they relate to
determinations of blight, substandard conditions, over-inclusiveness of
areas targeted for redevelopment, or questions of pretext. Instead, the
court applies a highly deferential standard to factual findings made by
agencies and municipalities, as well as those of the legislature.
The New York Court of Appeals' deference to findings by other
political bodies has a long history. In a well-respected treatise on municipal corporations, Judge Forrest Dillon explained that once a legislature
has declared a public use, the courts will respect the declaration unless it
is "plainly without reasonable foundation." 72 This deference can be
traced back at least as far as New York City Housing Authority v.
Muller.7 3 In adjudicating the taking of land for improvement and housing, the Muller court carefully noted that while "legislative findings and
the determination of public use are not conclusive on the courts . .. they
are entitled at least to great respect, since they relate to public conditions
concerning which the Legislature both by necessity and duty must have
known." 74 The court accepted the findings of fact and conclusions made
by the legislature, in part because all of the conditions that had concerned
the legislature were actually present in this case. 75 The court concluded,
based on its own independent analysis of relevant case law in New York
and other states, that a finding of public purpose in slum clearance and
public housing was justified.7 6
70 See id. at 405-06.
71 See id. at 405 (rejecting the argument that the taking's principle purpose was revenue
production).
72 JOHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 1036 (600) (5th ed., rev. 1911).
7 See 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
74 Id. at 154.
75 See id.
76 Id. at 154-56.
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The New York Court of Appeals employed very similar thinking in
Murray v. La Guardia77 just seven years later. In that case, the court
considered the legislature's declaration of policy as embodied by the
constitution, rather than through statute.7 8 The court again accepted the
statement of legislative reasons as sufficient to sustain a public
purpose.7 9
In Kaskel v. Impellitteri,80 the New York Court of Appeals made
another strong statement regarding its unwillingness to look closely at a
political branch's determination of whether a public purpose exists where
the government is attempting to exercise its eminent domain power. In
Kaskel, the plaintiff sued under New York General Municipal Law § 51,
which authorized prosecution of government agents for illegal acts.8 1
The plaintiff alleged that several public officials made incorrect findings
regarding the "substandard or insanitary" condition of the disputed
area. 82 The plaintiff wanted a trial to determine as a matter of fact
whether the proposed site was "substandard or insanitary" and ultimately, whether the officials acted illegally by exceeding the bounds of
the enabling statute.8 3 The court issued two strong opinions.
In the majority opinion, Judge Charles S. Desmond looked to other
cases interpreting the rights of taxpayers to challenge official acts of government agents under § 51.184 Under the standard generally applied to
§ 51, an official action should not be enjoined unless the action involves
fraud or a waste of public money in the sense that the official was acting
for entirely illegal purposes.8 5 Because the plaintiff only alleged that the
actions complained of were "arbitrary and capricious," and had not
pleaded fraud or illegality, he failed to state a claim under the statute, and
the court granted summary judgment. 86 The majority went on to say:
One can conceive of a hypothetical case where the physical conditions of an area might be such that it would be
irrational and baseless to call it substandard or insani-

tary, in which case, probably, the conditions for the exercise of the power would not be present. However, the
situation here actually displayed is one of those as to
which the Legislature has authorized the city officials,
77 Murray v. La Guardia, 52 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1943).
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 887-88.
Id. at 888.

83
84
85
86

See
See
See
See

115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953).
See id. at 661; see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW
See Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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including elected officials, to make a determination, and
so the making thereof is simply an act of government,
that is, an exercise of governmental power, legislative in
fundamental character, which, whether wise or unwise,
cannot be overhauled by the courts. If there were to be a
trial here and the courts below should decide in favor of
plaintiff, there would be effected a transfer of power
from the appropriate public officials to the courts. The
question is simply not a justiciable one.87
The court also pointed out that though it was unlikely that responsible public officials would wrongfully label an area as substandard and
insanitary, it may occur at some point in the future, and, upon that occurrence, the court would address the situation.8 8
In a separate opinion, Judge John Van Voorhis dissented, writing
that triable issues of fact existed and that the plaintiffs pleadings sufficiently raised the issues as evinced by the record before the court.89 The
dissent took the view that a showing of fraud or illegality was not literally required, but rather, this requirement was simply an unfortunate
phrasing of an extreme abuse of discretion. 90 For purposes of a summary
judgment motion in the Kaskel case, Van Voorhis explained that the facts
on the record, read in conjunction with the pleading, were sufficient to
"rebut the presumption of regularity of official acts." 9 ' The dissent also
took issue with the majority's view that this sort of question is inappropriate for decision by the judicial branch. 92 The dissent urged that
though the court should not involve itself in every determination involving agency discretion, this question was within the court's competence
and jurisdiction. 93 The dissent further urged that it was appropriate to
limit the bounds of agency or official discretion in some circumstances.9 4
Of these two competing viewpoints, the majority has proved more
lasting.9 5 Other courts have followed the Kaskel court's hands-off approach not only in cases where procedural limitations inform the outcome, but also in challenges to takings by property owners who are
directly affected and are asserting a substantive, constitutional defense to
87 See id. at 662.
88 See id. at 663.
89 See id. at 665 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
90 See id.
91 Id. at 669.

92 See id. at 665-66.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See, e.g., Goldstein v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 173 (N.Y.
2009).
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the taking. 96 In Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corporation, for example, the court held that as long as the agency's findings
are reasonable, its determination that a taking is valid will stand-even

over plaintiffs reasonable objections.97 Accordingly, "It is only where
there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an
area is blighted, that judges may substitute their views."9 8
The Court of Appeals applied this strongly deferential standard in
the Yonkers decision as well. Although it noted that courts need to do
more than simply rubber-stamp agency and municipality decisions, 99 the
court did precisely this in holding for the government agency in Yonkers.
The Community Development Agency of the City of Yonkers made a
determination that at least 50% of the land in question was substandard
and sought to condemn it.'0 In its pleadings, however, the agency did
not provide any factual support for its assertion. 0 1 It merely supplemented its pleading with information about the improvements to the
land.102 But because the landowners focused their appeal on the benefit
to private parties rather than on the condition of the land, the court did
not take issue with the agency's inadequate pleadings. 103 As a result, the
issue of whether the land was actually substandard was foreclosed, and,
relying on the decision in Kaskel, the court held that the agency's determination that the land was substandard was "adequate" and entitled to
deference.104 Even though the agency had no evidence to support its
bare assertion that substandard conditions existed, the court declined to
scrutinize the agency's determination because the landowners failed to
properly address the issue in their pleadings.10 5 Rather than require the
agency to supplement its pleadings with some sort of factual predicate on
which to base its assertions, the court deferred-again deftly side-stepping its role in determining the limits of the government's eminent domain power.
The New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly and emphatically
renounced any significant role in policing the limits of public use as it
relates to agency or municipality findings of blight, substandard conditions, and other issues appropriate for review by a court. This deference
has produced predictable results: A tie between a landowner and the gov96 See id. at 172.
97 See id. at 173.
98 Id.

99 See Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975).
100 See id. at 332.

101 See id. at 333.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 334.
104 See id.
105 See id.
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ernment will almost certainly result in deference to the government. This
is undoubtedly a troubling way to guard constitutional rights.
C. Expansive and Questionable Holdings
The problems created by the New York Court of Appeals' reluctance to police the limits of eminent domain power are compounded by
its issuance of unclear and convoluted holdings. Later courts have often
misconstrued or misapplied the Court of Appeals' ambiguous holdings,
and this is gradually shifting the law away from the original holdings
without explicit constitutional authorization or even intention to do so.
This trend appeared early in modern New York eminent domain
jurisprudence. In Kaskel v. Impellitteri, the court was presented with a
complicated factual question of possible overinclusion in a seized
area. 106 The disputed area contained many areas that both sides accepted
as "substandard and insanitary," but the plaintiffs contended that the contested property was unrelated to the disputed areas and its seizure was
not necessary to accomplish the city's goals.10 7
The majority in Kaskel decided the case on narrow grounds. Presiding over a taxpayer action under § 51 of the New York General Municipal Law, the court held that it could only prevent the seizure of property
if the taxpayer funds were being expended entirely for illegal purposes.' 08 Because the plaintiffs failed to specifically allege municipal
fraud, the court held that it could not enjoin the seizure.109 The court
also reasoned that because the question under § 51 was one of bare illegality of the seizure rather than the legality of the scope of the seizure, a
challenge based on a theory of over-inclusion was inappropriate for the
court to review.1 10
Although the Kaskel majority avoided a closer examination of the
particulars of this taking, it did not completely foreclose an attack upon
the scope of an eminent domain seizure. The court recognized that in
some circumstances, a party might validly argue that a seizure was simply overinclusive, saying: "One can conceive of a hypothetical case
where the physical conditions of an area might be such that it would be
irrational and baseless to call it substandard or insanitary.""' The dissenters who took this tack did not feel as constrained as the majority in a
106 See 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1953).
107 See id. at 661--62.
108 See id.; see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW

109 See Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661-62.
110 See id. at 662.
III Id.

§

51 (consol. 2010).

206

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20:191

taxpayer-plaintiff case, and they would have allowed this case to at least
move past the summary judgment stage, and come before a fact finder.' 12
Notably, both the majority and the minority in Kaskel appear to
agree that the primary purpose of an eminent domain taking must be its
public purpose. This peculiarity was noted specifically in Yonkers." 3
This small aside, however, garnered no significant attention, and the
New York Court of Appeals has almost never revisited at length the idea
that a project's public purpose must be its primary purpose.l 14
This forgotten rule is far from unique in New York takings law.
The New York Court of Appeals in Cannata helped shape another rule
that struggled to find its niche. In that case, a group of homeowners
brought a suit seeking to enjoin the taking of their land for a redevelopment project.' 15 The public use in Cannatawas decidedly unique. The
court based its holding on § 72 of the New York General Municipal Law,
which granted eminent domain power where a particular location showed
mere risk of blight. 1l 6 The statute listed several conditions that, when
found, could justify an eminent domain taking:
[S]ubdivision of the land into lots of such form, shape or
size as to be incapable of effective development; obsolete and poorly designed street patterns with inadequate
access; unsuitable topographic or other physical conditions impeding the development of appropriate uses; obsolete utilities; buildings unfit for use or occupancy as a
result of age, obsolescence, etc.; dangerous, unsanitary
or improper uses and conditions adversely affecting public health, safety or welfare; scattered improvements. 17
This list seems to greatly expand the power of eminent domain, but
it came with a major limitation: For the enumerated conditions to fulfill a
finding of public use thereby enabling the use of eminent domain power,
the land had to be predominantly vacant. 1"
The land involved in Cannata, being 75% vacant, met this newlyarticulated requirement, and the court had no trouble determining that the
taking in question served a public use.' 19 Section 72 may have been
constitutionally suspect for its broad grant of power over private land for
112 See id. at 663 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
113 Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975).
114 But see Goldstein v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 188 (N.Y.
2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).
115 See Cannata v. City of New York, 182 N.E.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. 1962).
116 See id.; see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw
117 Cannata, 182 N.E.2d at 396.
118 See id.
119 See id.
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mere risk of blight, and indeed, it was subsequently repealed.120 Notwithstanding the status of the statute, however, the area in question was

arguably substandard even by a traditional understanding. 12 1
The real harm from the statute was not truly revealed until years
later, when the New York Court of Appeals' decided Yonkers. The
breadth of the factors enumerated in the statute was narrowed in Cannata
by the statutory requirement that an area be predominantly vacant.122
The court in Yonkers, however, seemed more concerned with following
the national trend in eminent domain law rather than observing established precedent. The court cited with approval all seven statutory factors quoted Cannata, as well as other public uses found in commentary
and cases from other states.123 Rather than detail the intricacy of the
statute-that it required a finding of vacancy along with the listed conditions, and furthermore, that it had long been repealed by the time of the
Yonkers decision-the court treated the factors cursorily.124 The court
was primarily concerned with clarifying that New York would follow a
"liberal rather than a literal definition" of blight.125
The New York Court of Appeals in Yonkers thus altered the understanding of public use by liberalizing the definition of blight in its
dicta.126 By including the expansive terms found in the repealed § 72
without an in-depth examination of how those conditions apply, the court
invited misinterpretation in subsequent decisions.127
The expansion of the eminent domain power, however, was not only
attributable to misconstruction and liberalization of the definition of
blight. The court in Courtesy Sandwich, for example, expanded eminent
domain through a more traditional means: namely, stretching questionable facts to fit a commonly accepted classic public use.128 The majority
allowed a taking for the World Trade Center based on a public use in the
classic sense-a public building to be used to "facilitate the flow of
commerce."1 29
The dissent, however, was suspicious of a massive project in which
the theory of public use rested on public benefits from a centralization of
international trade.' 3 0 The vague statutory mandate authorizing the pro120 See id. at 397 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
121 See id.
122 See id. at 396-97 (majority opinion).
123 See Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975).
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.

127 See, e.g., Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402,
405 (N.Y. 1963).
128 See id.
129 See id. at 404-05.

130 See id. at 409 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
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ject seemed so broad as to allow nearly any proposed business project to
fit the profile.131 The dissent argued that this statute allowed the city to
transform the project from a public works building into a simple real
estate investment, with the city as the proprietor. 132 The majority and
dissent's rebranding of the same facts did nothing to clear the waters for
subsequent eminent domain cases.
D.

Lower Courts

Several lower court decisions have fallen victim to the quagmire of
eminent domain law created by the New York Court of Appeals. The
combination of a failure to explicitly disavow economic development as
a valid public use, an exceedingly deferential approach to the findings of
municipalities and agencies, and the expansive trend of holdings and
dicta in the New York Court of Appeals has given the Appellate Division
little guidance.
The first lower court case to explicitly recognize economic development as a public use with no mention of amelioration of blight or slum
clearance was Northeast Parent& Child Society, Inc. v. Schenectady Industrial Development Agency.13 3 In that case, an agency condemned a
former school recently purchased by the petitioners in order to entice an
industrial tenant to remain in the community. 13 4 The court upheld this as
a valid public purpose by finding that the project's public purpose "was
to increase Schenectady's tax base and diversify its economy."1 35 Unsurprisingly, the court made no mention of substandard or insanitary conditions, blight, or slum clearance. The building was clearly none of these
things and was only seized in order to entice another private party to
remain in the city.
The trend toward pure economic takings continued nine years later
in Sunrise Properties v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency.1 36 In that
case, the petitioner challenged a taking as providing no public use, benefit, or purpose.13 7 The court unequivocally held that respondent's determination that "condemnation of the property would create jobs, provide
infrastructure, and possibly stimulate new private sector economic development" satisfied the public purpose requirement. 138 There was no determination that the property was substandard, only that it was
131 See id.
132 See id. at 409-11.

133 494 N.Y.S.2d 503 (App. Div. 1985).
134 See id. at 504-05.
135 Id. at 504.

136 614 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 1994).
137 See id. at 842.
138 Id.
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underutilized, thus making it even clearer that the taking was only motivated by economic development. 139
Following the Appellate Division's decisions in Sunrise Properties
and Northeast Parent & Child, the determination in In re Fisher'4 0 was
not a dramatic divergence. In Fisher, the government condemned petitioner's rent-stabilized apartment to clear space for a proposed New York
Stock Exchange project.141 The court held that the project constituted a
public use by writing that it would "result in substantial public benefits,
among them increased tax revenues, economic development and job opportunities as well as preservation and enhancement of New York's prestigious position as a worldwide financial center." 142 As in the two
abovementioned cases, the court held on these economic grounds exclusively, with no mention of substandard or insanitary conditions.
The holding in Fisher illustrates the slowly creeping, judicially-interpreted definition of public use. To support its holding, the Fisher
court cited Greenwich Associates v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority,143 which defined public use "as any use which contributes to the
health, safety, general welfare, convenience or prosperity of the community."'" This broad language seems unnecessary, as the challenged taking in Greenwich did not involve a taking for economic development.
Instead, the government intended the taking to provide increased access
and support to a railroad facility, an objective which is properly understood as a classic public use' 4 5 Greenwich, in turn, adopted the language
from Byrne ex rel. Pine Grove Beach Ass'n. v. New York State Office of
46
Despite the broad lanParks, Recreation & Historic Preservation.1
guage, Byrne merely affirmed another uncontroversial, classic public
use-the creation of a refuge for the safety of boaters on Lake
Ontario.' 47
The unnecessarily broad language of these holdings originates with
Muller.14 8 The Muller court, however, narrowly stated that a public purpose could be found only when a condition seemed to be a "substantial
139 See

id.
140 730 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 2001).
141 See id. at 516.
142 Id. at 517.

143 548 N.Y.S.2d 190 (App. Div. 1989), dismissed sub nom. Regency-Lexington Partners
v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 552 N.E.2d 178 (1990).
144 Id. at 193 (quoting Byrne ex rel. Pine Grove Beach Ass'n. v. New York State Office
of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres., 476 N.Y.S.2d 42, 42 (App. Div. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145 See Greenwich Associates v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 548 N.Y.S.2d
190, 191 (App. Div. 1989).
146 Byrne, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
147 See id.
148 See 1 N.E.2d 153, 154-55 (N.Y. 1936).
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menace." And the Muller court only allowed for action when the "power
applied is reasonably and fairly calculated to check it, and bears a reasonable relation to the evil."' 49 Accordingly, the court rested its holding
on the dual public purposes of slum clearance and creation of low-cost
public housing.o50 Despite these limitations, the Muller opinion contained dicta regarding the "fundamental purpose of government," which
later courts used in subsequent opinions to support a broader definition
of public use.' 5 ' This expansive reading by later courts is made even
more puzzling by the fact that the state constitution was amended two
years after Muller to include creation of public housing or slum clearance
as the basis for the eminent domain power without a mention of either
economic development or the "health, safety, and general welfare of the
public."' 5 2 The definition of public use has changed dramatically from
that time to the period of expansive holdings in cases such as Fisher.
The expansive holdings and dicta in New York Court of Appeals
decisions have given the Appellate Division significant leeway in defining public use in eminent domain cases. With such flexibility and an
unwillingness to specifically disavow economic development as a valid
public use, the lower courts, unsurprisingly, have begun to craft their
own meanings.

III. THE ATLANTIC YARDS

DECISION:

A

STUDY IN THE

COMMON ISSUES
Many of the issues that have befuddled both lower courts and lawyers are presented in the New York Court of Appeals' recent decision in
Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.15 3 In Goldstein,
the court had a golden opportunity to clarify takings law in New York,
but instead chose evade the difficult constitutional questions-perhaps
indefinitely. The case also illustrates the many practical issues courts are
faced with in large-scale eminent domain cases.
A. Facts and History of the Case
The court in Goldstein presented the factual and procedural history
of the case in detail.154 The proposed development in Goldstein was
nothing if not grand. The Atlantic Yards project, to be located in downtown Brooklyn, envisioned sixteen towers for both housing and commercial purposes, a modernized rail yard with increased access to existing
149 See id. at 155.
150 See id. at 155-56.
151 See id. at 155.
152 See N.Y. CONST. art. XVm, § I (amended 2001).
153 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
154 See id. at 165-67
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facilities, large landscaped open space, and various transportation infrastructure improvements.1 55 The centerpiece and driving factor behind
the project was a basketball arena-the new home for the New Jersey
Nets' NBA franchise.15 6 The proposed site for this project included the
Atlantic Yards railway terminal, previously designated as an urban renewal target, as well as other privately-owned properties.157 While some
private property owners willingly sold their lands to the developer, Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), others refused.158 ESDC
then determined that the properties that had not been sold contained indicia of blight or of impending blight and condemned the properties.1 59
The petitioners challenging the takings were the owners of some of the

holdout properties.

16 0

Before the case came to trial in state court, the petitioners brought a
claim in federal district court alleging that the condemnation violated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 161 The petitioners also brought
a state law claim in an attempt to get the federal court to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction. 1 6 2 Dismissing the federal claim with
prejudice, the district court unsurprisingly relied on the line of precedent
begun by the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker 63 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 6 and resulting in Kelo v. City of New
London,165 which broadly declared economic development a valid public
use.' 66 The district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to decide the state law claims.167 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, also leaving the state claims intact.168
Following their defeat in federal court, the petitioners brought a
claim in state court alleging, among other claims, that the taking violated
the New York constitution. 169 The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
however, accepted the respondent's position that the public purpose of
See id. at 166.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 165-66.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
155

161
162

See Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
See id.

163 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

16 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
165 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

166 See Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 279-87, 291.
167 See id. at 291.
168 See Goldstein v.

Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 65 (2d Cir. 2008).
169 See Goldstein v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 879 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (App.
Div. 2008), affd, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
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the project was elimination of blight and denied the petition.170 The peti-

tioners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.' 7 '
B.

Goldstein and the Issues in New York Takings Law

The majority and dissenting opinions in Goldstein illustrate many of
the problems in New York eminent domain jurisprudence. Even where
the takings issues do not directly impact the court's holding, the opinions
illuminate the key considerations.
The broadest question presented before the court was whether the
New York constitution recognized a public use in economic redevelopment absent a finding of blight.' 7 2 The New York Court of Appeals had
never expressly held on this point, and Goldstein provided an ideal opportunity to do so.'7
If the New York Court of Appeals interpreted the New York constitution to read that economic development alone was not a valid public
use, the New York constitution would be more protective of property
rights than the U.S. Constitution.17 4 As the dissent pointed out, the majority did not foreclose that option.17 5 The majority, in fact, left the door
cracked open to that proposition: "While there remains a hypothetical
case in which we might intervene to prevent an urban redevelopment
condemnation on public use grounds -where 'the physical conditions of
an area might be such that it would be irrational and baseless to call it
substandard or insanitary,'-this is not that case."' 7 6 In short, the majority seemed at least willing to entertain the idea that the New York constitution places independent restrictions on state eminent domain power
beyond those provided in the U.S. Constitution.
The blight requirement hardly restricts eminent domain, however, if
it is accompanied by a low factual threshold for blight. As discussed
above, New York courts have slowly expanded the scope of blight, from
its original meaning of truly blighted areas to include areas that could not
be considered blighted by any reasonable interpretation of the term.' 77
As a factual matter, it is unclear whether the areas that the developer
deemed blighted and condemned were truly blighted. The dissent took
serious issue with the blight study relied upon by the majority, instead
arguing that the area "appears

. . .

to be a normal and pleasant residential

170 See id. at 535-37.

171 See Goldstein v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y.
2009).
172 See id. at 170-72.
173 See supra Part H.A.

See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting).
See id. at 171 (majority opinion).
176 See id. at 172 (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953)).
177 See supra Part I.C.
174
175
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community." 7 8 Even the majority acknowledged that the blight is not as
severe or pervasive as that which existed during the Great Depressionwhen the state constitution was amended to allow for takings to ameliorate blight.' 79 The majority opinion also conceded that "[i]t may be that
the bar has now been set too low," but it did not explore this point in
depth. 180
Following the general trend in takings cases, the majority in Goldstein was highly deferential to the agency on the factual issues.' 8 ' Any
agency can quite easily meet its burden of showing blight because, as the
court stated, "It is only where there is no room for reasonable difference
of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that judges may substitute
their views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of blight
removal has been made out .... "182 The court readily acknowledged
that in some cases a petitioner would be able to make out a colorable
case that a property is not in fact blighted, but that argument may simply
be considered another reasonable view that would not prevail. 83 The
court's high degree of deference to the agencies is common in takings
cases and it indicates the court's willingness to respect the legislature's
policy choices-as carried out by the administrative agency-at the expense of protection of private property through higher burdens of proof
in challenges to agency findings.184
Concerns over factual accuracy are not the only potential problems
with the blight study. This type of study, though performed for municipal corporations, is often commissioned and paid for by the developers
who seek to utilize the land.' 8 5 The majority recognized, and the dissent
agreed, that this can lead to pressure by developers on the consultants
conducting the study, which calls the study's credibility into question.186
The dissent forcefully argued that the area was not blighted and that the
blight study indicates as much.' 87 The dissent pointed out that the consultants selected their words carefully, and ultimately "concluded that the
area of the proposed Atlantic Yards development, taken as a whole, was
'characterized by blighted conditions."' 8 8 The dissent found the prospect of condemnation based on this rather weak finding highly troubling.
178 Goldstein at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting).
'79

See id. at 171 (majority opinion).

180 Id. at 172.
181 See id. at 173.
182 Id. at 172.
183 See id.

184 See supra Part I.B.
185 See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172-73.
186 See id. at 172-73, 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting).
187 See id. at 190.
188 Id. (quoting ESDC's blight study).
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The dissent also questioned whether blight had become a tool for
transferring property from the powerless to the powerful. 189 Convinced
that a finding of blight was simply a pretext in this case, Judge Robert S.
Smith wrote that the true purpose of the project was profit, not blight
amelioration or slum clearance.190 In fact, the record incontrovertibly
shows that when the project was initially proposed, there was no mention
of blight, but only of the opportunity for economic gain.19 1 Blight did
not become the justification for the project until two years later.192 Developers, municipal corporations, and consultants seemed to have realized that the magic word for major projects was blight, and they played
along by finding blight wherever they could.
In addition to refusing to closely monitor agencies, the majority in
Goldstein expressed unwillingness to second-guess what it deemed to be
a legislative choice.19 3 Here, the court lacked significant power to review the legislature's choice (i.e., vesting in the ESDC substantial power
to determine that an area is blighted).19 4 The majority felt that the power
to curb eminent domain power is "appropriately situated in the policymaking branches of government."1 95 The majority opinion, however, acknowledged that the concept of public use had undergone an evolution
through judicial interpretations.1 96 Even so, it remains unclear why the
majority insisted that the legislature has the sole power to define public
use. Moreover, it seems absurd that the Goldstein majority would require the legislature to pass a law to affirm what a previous law had
already declared-especially when the standard would have been clear
but for the actions of the New York Court of Appeals.
The dissent took the Goldstein majority to task for this view.197 The
opinion pointed to a line of New York cases dating back over a century
to show that the determination of whether a taking is truly for a public
use is in fact a matter for the courts to decide.198 The dissent drew an
analogy to other basic constitutional rights by highlighting the senselessness in proscribing the courts from deciding the constitutional issue of
whether a taking is for a public use.199 The dissent was also uncomfortable with leaving too much fact-finding in the hands of agencies and legis189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

See id. at 189.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 172-73 (majority opinion).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting).
See id.
199 Id.
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latures: "[T]o allow them to decide the facts on which constitutional
rights depend is to render the constitutional protections impotent." 200
The Goldstein case provides an excellent example of many of the
issues present in New York takings cases and how the court addresses
many of the issues. The Goldstein court avoided the broad question of
whether economic development alone is a public use for eminent domain
purposes and, instead, decided the case on the narrower blight grounds.
The court left determination of the difficult factual question of whether
or not the area was truly blighted to the agency which imposes a low
burden of proof in making such a determination. 20 1 Both the majority
and the dissent acknowledged the possibility of pretext or impure motives on the part of the developer, but the idea did not carry any water in
either opinion.20 2 The majority also dodged the question of whether the
judicially defined standard for blight had become too expansive by saying that a determination of blight should rightfully be made by the legislature rather than the courts. 203 The court seemed determined to visit
each of the relevant issues without stopping long enough to significantly
clear up any of the problems inherent in each issue.
IV.

REINING IN EMINENT DOMAIN POWER

While the New York Court of Appeals in Goldstein did not forcefully address any of the issues surrounding the exercise of eminent domain, the door remains open for it to do so. Significant aspects of this
power deserve a closer look by the court to ensure that the power of
eminent domain is properly exercised.
A.

Expressly Exclude Economic Development Takings from "Public
Use"

The first step the New York Court of Appeals should take is to
follow the urging in the Goldstein dissent and specifically disavow economic development as a public use under the New York constitution. 204
Despite lower court interpretations of the questionable dicta in New York
Court of Appeals cases, 205 the court has not determined if the New York
constitution is more protective than the U.S. Constitution regarding the
issue of whether economic development alone can constitute a public
use. 2 0 6 Notably, the 1967 Constitutional Convention deliberated over a
200 Id.
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Id. at 172.
Id.; id. at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 172.
See id. at 187-89 (Smith, J., dissenting).
See supra Part I.D.
See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 173.
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proposed amendment to Article XVHI of the Constitution to grant the
legislature broad authority to carry out "urban" (including commercial)
renewal.207 The fact that this proposed constitutional amendment was
not adopted is at least persuasive, though not dispositive, evidence for
the proposition that the legislative branch does not, or at least did not,
consider economic development a public use under the current formulation of the New York constitution. 208
Without the New York Court of Appeals' clear rejection of economic development as a public use, lower courts will continue to affirm
takings on economic development grounds and will, consequently, reduce protections for property owners. When considering the lower
courts' jurisprudence regarding economic development in concert with
the ease of finding blight on a tenuous factual basis, governmental condemnation of private property appears much easier than protection of the
property by its owners.
B. Enforce a Requirement of Actual Blight
The New York Court of Appeals can take strong steps toward curing many of the problems in takings cases by ensuring that factual findings of blight are true and accurate. To cure the problems, courts must
require increased factual accuracy and rely on actual determinations of
fact, rather than simply deferring to agency determinations of blight.
As the court recognized in Goldstein, allowing a developer to com209
mission its own blight study necessarily involves conflicts of interest.
The consultants whose blight studies have been commissioned by developers clearly face pressure to find blight, and they may couch their findings in terms that favor developers' interests. 2 10 Of course, findings may
still receive significant deference by the courts, leading to condemnation
on a questionable factual record. But, that inequity is currently the rule,
not the exception. In both Cannata and Kaskel the court relied on
agency determinations to form its decisions even though the agency de2 11
terminations stood on questionable factual bases themselves.
Even when parties have directly challenged the factual accuracy of a
blight study, the courts have consistently upheld the agency's determination. 2 12 Even more troubling, the Kaskel court ignored an independent
study, done by a qualified consultant at the petitioners' request, while
207 See STATE COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 59.
208 See N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 7 (amended 2001); N.Y. CONST. art.

XVm, § 1.
209 See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172-73.
210 See, e.g., id at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting).
211 See Cannata v. City of New York, 182 N.E.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. 1962); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1953).
212 See, e.g., Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 441-42
(N.Y. 1986).
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favoring the agency's determination. 2 13 Faced with such hurdles, it is
unclear how a petitioner could possibly convince a court that "the physical conditions of an area might be such that it would be irrational and
baseless to call it substandard or insanitary." 2 14 When competing valid
classifications exist, the courts consistently favor the agency. 2 15 In the
realm of basic constitutional rights, this is more than a bit disconcerting.
Overzealous deference to agency findings creates an incentive for
developers to posture takings for economic development as projects intended for blight reduction or slum clearance. The Goldstein dissent
raised the issue of pretext, questioning whether blight reduction was truly
the motive behind the project when it was not mentioned until two years
after its inception. 2 16 Yet, strictly requiring a discussion of blight from
the outset will only drive the problem underground: a savvy developer
will know the magic words to use and will couch all discussions in those
terms from the outset. Courts must instead police the line of pretext in
other ways.
C.

Ensure that the Public Purpose is the Dominant Purpose

To ensure that blight is not used as a smoke-screen justification for
an ordinary real estate development venture, the courts must make an
independent determination, based on a factually accurate record, that the
public purpose is truly the dominant purpose of the project. The Court of
Appeals agrees that landowners must have some legitimate recourse. 2 17
The dominant purpose threshold, however, is too low. The courts
have not invalidated a taking, despite perfunctorily stating that as between a taking's public purpose and private benefit, the public purpose
must be dominant. 2 18 Courts seem more interested in the proposition's
rhetorical value than its substantive value.
Taken separately or in concert, the abovementioned changes can
solve many of the runaway aspects of the eminent domain power in New
York. 2 19 The drastic transformation in New York eminent domain jurisprudence is the result of the New York Court of Appeals' continued insistence that the legislature resolve the current inequities in eminent
213 See Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661-62, 664-65 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 662 (majority opinion).
215 See e.g., id. at 661-62.

216 See Goldstein v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 189 (N.Y. 2009)
(Smith, J., dissenting).
217 See, e.g., Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 167 (majority opinion); In re Waldo's Inc. v. Johnson City, 543 N.E.2d 74, 76 (N.Y. 1986); Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d
327, 331 (N.Y. 1975).
218 See, e.g., Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 167.
219 See id. at 172-73.
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domain law, and its own capitulation to municipal agencies and powerful
developers over the course of several decades.
CONCLUSION

The status of economic development as a recognized public use in
New York is still uncertain. 220 While the New York Court of Appeals
has not explicitly recognized economic development as a public purpose,
it has come close to doing so in its expansive dicta and unwillingness to
limit agency and municipality discretion as to the definition of blight.
The result is a confusing morass of cases that are difficult for lower
courts to navigate. Some lower courts have specifically recognized economic development as a public use, while others still require a showing
of blight, plans for a public housing project, or other classic public uses
to uphold a taking. 22 1
The New York Court of Appeals can still take steps to protect property owners in New York. The court has continuously reserved judgment
on the specific question of whether economic development is a valid
public use under the New York constitution. A definitive holding that
economic development alone does not constitute a public use will end
abuse of the blight standard by powerful developers-such as those behind the Atlantic Yards project-and ensure that the courts do not sacrifice the true intent behind the empowering constitutional provisions.
Unfortunately, the New York Court of Appeals may never find the "hypothetical case" it seeks to disavow economic development takings. In-

stead, it appears that the power to protect small property owners from
abuse by powerful developers rests quietly in the legislature.

220 See supra Part II.

221 Compare Ne. Parent & Child Soc'y, Inc. v. Schenectady Indus. Dev. Agency, 494
N.Y.S.2d 503 (App. Div. 1985) (finding promotion of Schenectady's economic welfare was a
public use), with W. 41st St. Realty LLC v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d
121 (App. Div. 2002).

